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Can Altruism Be Unified?	
	
Grant Ramsey 





There is clearly a plurality of forms of altruism. Classically, biological altruism is 
distinguished from psychological altruism. Recent discussions of altruism have attempted 
to distinguish even more forms of altruism. I will focus on three altruism concepts, 
biological altruism, psychological altruism, and helping altruism. The questions I am 
concerned with here are, first, how should we understand these concepts? and second, 
what relationship do these concepts bear to one another? In particular, is there an 
essence to altruism that unifies these concepts? I suggest that while there is no essence to 
altruism, this does not mean that the array of altruism concepts is completely disunified. 
Instead, I propose we place all the concepts into a common framework—an altruism 
space—that could lead to new questions about how this space can be filled.	
 
1. Introduction	
‘Altruism’	clearly has diverse meanings. In discussions of altruism, many are careful to 
distinguish between biological (or evolutionary) altruism and psychological altruism. 
Biological altruism is often understood to center on fitness exchanges, whereas 
psychological altruism is based on intentions—an act is psychologically altruistic not 
because of the outcomes, but because of particular intentions of the actor. This distinction 
has become all but standard in the study of altruism (Sober & Wilson 1998). 	
 The psychological-biological distinction, however, does not appear to exhaust the 
range of varieties of altruism. The reason for this is that there are forms of altruism that 
are not clearly either biological or psychological in nature. Some instances of helping, for 
example, count as altruism independently of both the psychological mechanisms driving 
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the behavior and their fitness consequences. Such ‘helping altruism’, as I will call it, is a 
genuinely distinct form of altruism.  	
 In this essay, my goal is to clarify the taxonomy of altruism concepts and to 
consider whether this diversity merely constitutes distinct concepts loosely related and 
collected under the rubric of altruism, or whether there is a deeper unity. I propose that 
while there is no essence to altruism, one can take what I suggest are the three central 
altruism concepts, render them as single scalar values, and construct a three-dimensional 
altruism space.1 This space will open up new empirical questions about how the space 
can be filled and why particular regions are, or are expected to be, empty. 	
 
2. A taxonomy of altruism concepts	
How many concepts of altruism are in circulation and what are their natures? This 
question, it turns out, is not an easy one to answer. The reason is that there is no standard 
array of altruism concepts and associated terms that can be relied upon to answer this. 
Instead, one must read the literature carefully to attempt to extract implied meanings in 
the various uses of ‘altruism’. There has, however, been a recent attempt to do just that. 
Clavien and Chapuisat (2013) have identified what they take to be four distinct concepts 
of altruism. I will thus begin with their framework and modify it in several ways. 	
 
2.1. Biological altruism	
Let’s begin with biological altruism, the concept of altruism tied to biological fitness. 
This form of altruism is also called evolutionary or, by Clavien and Chapuisat, 
reproductive altruism. None of these terms is entirely appropriate. While this form of 
altruism is linked to fitness/selection, it is a mistake to think that it is tied to just an 
individual’s reproductive output: Measures of reproductive success such as lifetime 
reproductive success (LRS) can serve as imperfect proxies for fitness, but fitness can 
change without changes in LRS. To see how LRS can deviate from fitness, consider two 
types of individuals, where one type is disposed to reproduce earlier in their life history 
than the other, but they are otherwise identical in terms of their longevity, health, etc. 
                                                1 Although his project is quite different, this is in the spirit of Godfrey-Smith’s (2009) Darwinian space.	
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Assuming that the organisms have overlapping generations (they are not, say, restricted 
to reproducing once each spring), the type that reproduces earlier in its life history will 
increase in proportion over time. This is true because over a given span of time, the early 
reproducing type will wedge in more generations and each individual of that type will, on 
average, have more descendants (assuming, of course, that there are no countervailing 
effects of early reproduction). The early reproducing type will thus be the fitter type of 
individual in spite of having the same LRS.	
 Just as LRS is too restrictive, tying biological altruism to evolution does not work 
either. The term ‘evolutionary altruism’	points correctly to the link between this form of 
altruism and core evolutionary concepts. But the dispositions to behave altruistically in 
the other senses discussed below are not somehow outside of evolution—they can 
certainly be evolved traits. A more appropriate term would be ‘fitness altruism’	or 
‘selection altruism’	since fitness/selection are definitionally linked with this form of 
altruism. But because I hesitate to coin yet another synonym for this form of altruism, I 
will henceforth use what is perhaps the most common term,	‘biological altruism’.  	
Clavien and Chapuisat define biological altruism thus:	“A behaviour is altruistic if 
it increases other organisms’	fitness and permanently decreases the actor’s own fitness” 
(2013, p. 128). Similarly, Sober and Wilson (1998) hold that “A behavior is altruistic 
when it increases the fitness of others and decreases the fitness of the actor”	(p. 17).2 
There are two things to notice about these definitions. First, they involve a loss to the 
actor and a benefit to the recipient(s)—it is not enough that the actor loses or that the 
recipient benefits, both must occur. Second, the fact that the actor relinquishes some of its 
fitness to boost the fitness of the recipient means that the fitness of individual organisms 
is something capable of changing as a result of these behaviors. Let’s consider whether 
fitness can change in these ways. 	
                                                2 A further distinction can be made between biologically strong altruism and weak altruism. The strong 
variety requires a cost to the actor and benefit to the recipient(s), whereas the weak variety includes a 
benefit for the recipient(s) and a more modest benefit for the actor (see Wilson, 1990 and Kerr, Godfrey-
Smith, and Feldman, 2004 for a discussion). Both strong and weak altruism thus require that the fitness 
benefit to others does not exceed a fitness benefit to the actor. Because of the relative unity of these 
concepts I will not further discuss weak altruism in this paper.	
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If fitness is to causally explain evolutionary outcomes, then it cannot be 
equivalent to those outcomes. One way that philosophers have proposed to avoid the 
equation of fitness and outcome is to consider fitness to be a probabilistic propensity to 
produce offspring, not actual offspring produced (Brandon 1978; Mills and Beatty 1979). 
A corollary of this view, or so argue Ramsey (2006) and Abrams (2009), is that the 
fitness value a particular organism has does not change from moment to moment. 
(Ramsey coined the term ‘block fitness’	for this understanding of fitness and I will follow 
his nomenclature.) The block fitness concept has urged some to rethink the way that 
biological altruism should be understood (Ramsey and Brandon 2011). The core idea is 
that organisms have particular fitness values, and that these values are based on their 
hereditary material, the environment that they are born into, the possible future states of 
this environment, and their possible interactions with it. If organismic fitness is a function 
of these properties, then it will be fixed over the life history of the individual. While it is 
true that the organism’s health can fluctuate—it can become ill or remain healthy—its 
fitness does not fluctuate accordingly. Even ending up sterile does not lower one’s 
fitness. Furthermore, while it is true that bearing viable offspring will raise an 
individual’s realized fitness, it will not raise its fitness. Realized fitness is a tally of 
outcomes, whereas fitness is the weighted probability distribution over the possible 
outcomes. 	
For those who are skeptical of the block fitness idea, consider this analogy: If we 
have a coin and a coin-flipping device and we flip the coin a number of times, we can 
produce several interesting quantities: (1) the probability that the coin has of landing head 
up prior to being flipped, (2) the instantaneous probability of landing head up at each 
moment throughout the course of its flips, and (3) the number of times the coin lands 
head up. The last of these is what we can analogize with the realized fitness of the coin. It 
is the result of the coin’s propensity, combined with the chance features of particular coin 
flips. These outcomes are not identical with the coin’s chances of landing head up, but 
serve as evidence for it. The second of these quantities is neither realized fitness nor 
fitness, though is sometimes confused with the latter. If the world is fundamentally 
indeterministic, or if the probabilities are based on partial information, then the values for 
(2) can vary over the life of a coin flip. But such a quantity (an instantaneous probability) 
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will be of little use for predicting or explaining or understanding the outcome of entire 
coin flips, though it could be useful in understanding some elements of the dynamics of 
coin flips. Like (3), it is an outcome—it is an outcome of the chance path that the coin 
has taken, combined with the coin’s weighted possible future paths. Such a measure 
partway through the flip of a coin may provide a useful estimate for the probable fate of 
the coin, but it is not a good estimate for how the coin will do when flipped again, or 
what the outcome is likely to be from a large number of such flips. For estimates of this 
kind, we need quantity (1).	
Quantity (1) is given by the properties of the coin (its symmetry, etc.) and the 
environment (whether it acts differentially with respect to each side of the coin). It does 
not fluctuate from moment to moment. The tallies of flip outcomes do, of course, 
change—they are ratcheted up over generations of coin flips. The first quantity, the 
probability of landing head up, is analogous to the block fitness of organisms. Like block 
fitness, it does not fluctuate from moment to moment. If a coin has a 0.5 probability of 
landing head up, this is true of the coin even if its instantaneous probability changes, and 
even if the coin is damaged or otherwise transformed during its flip (see Ramsey 2006 for 
a more extensive discussion of this point).	
Quantity (1) is what is analogous to fitness. Just as the fitness of a coin is a 
function of the set of possible ways it can undergo its flip—and the associated 
probability-weighted outcomes—so is the fitness of organisms based on their possible 
life histories. And while fitness is based on the set of possibilities, realized fitness is 
based on the one life history that the organism realizes. If this is true, then biological 
altruism needs to be reconceived: Altruistic acts are no longer acts whose performance 
lowers the fitness of the actor and raises the fitness of the recipient. How then should we 
reconceive biological altruism?	
A full explication and defense of a revised account of biological altruism is well 
beyond the scope of this paper, but what I will say here is this: Biological altruism should 
not be taken to be based on the outcomes of individual actions, but should instead be 
based on the organism’s propensities to act and the probable outcomes of its actions. 
Altruistic acts are therefore ones that issue from a particular kind of disposition and are 
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associated with a particular kind of outcome. Thus, instead of taking its outcome to be 
determinative of being an altruistic act, it is better to understand it in the following way:	
 
An act is altruistic if and only if having the act in the behavioral repertoire of the 
individual (1) lowers its fitness and (2) increases the fitness of the recipient(s) (or 
the group to which the altruist belongs). 	
 
This concept of altruism, then, follows directly from the fact that fitness is a 
propensity, and that the value of an organism’s fitness is invariant over its lifetime. 
Consider again Clavien and Chapuisat’s definition: “A behaviour is altruistic if it 
increases other organisms’	fitness and permanently decreases the actor’s own fitness” 
(2013, p. 128). They are correct about the permanence, but if this is understood as the act 
having a permanent effect, this is wrong. Instead, it is permanent in that it is a disposition 
that arises from the fixed organism-environment setup—the organism’s genes, the 
environment into which it is born, and the probable future environmental features.	
 
2.2. Psychological altruism	
Now consider psychological altruism. Stich (2007) offers a clear definition of this 
concept: “A behavior is psychologically altruistic if and only if it is motivated by an 
ultimate desire for the well-being of some other organism, and as a first pass, we can say 
that a desire is ultimate if its object is desired for its own sake, rather than because the 
agent thinks that satisfying the desire will lead to the satisfaction of some other desire” 
(p. 286). Let’s consider the details of this definition and how it differs from biological 
altruism. 	
 Whereas biological altruism is linked to core behavioral dispositions, 
psychological altruism is based on facts about the psychological states of individuals. 
And although the desires adverted to in Stich’s definition are desires for future states, 
these states do not need to be realized in order for the behavior to be altruistic. An 
individual who gives money to a charity, where this gift is motivated by an ultimate 
desire to help others, will be performing an altruistic act even if the money is mishandled 
and ends up doing no good. And an individual who gives money to a charity that does in 
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fact increase the well-being of others, but whose gift was made only in order to quash the 
rumors that they are greedy, is not acting altruistically in this sense. 	
 While psychologically altruistic behaviors necessarily stem from certain kinds of 
ultimate desires, just as the behaviors do not in fact have to result in increasing the well-
being of others, the behaviors also bear no necessary relationship with biological fitness. 
Being disposed to act for the well-being of others does not necessarily mean that one is 
less fit than an individual who is psychologically selfish—it could be that psychologically 
altruistic individuals fare better in terms of biological fitness. That is, there is no 
conceptual link between biological and psychological altruism. This is not to say that 
there are no empirical links between them. It could, for example, be the case that 
psychologically altruistic mechanisms are a good way to realize biological altruism and 
that, as Sober and Wilson (1998) suggest, “natural selection is unlikely to have given us 
purely egoistic motives”	(p. 12). These empirical points are of interest, and below I will 
reflect on the sort of empirical questions that one can (or should) investigate with respect 
to altruism. But for the sake of this section, only the conceptual points are relevant.	
 Psychological and biological altruism are the two forms of altruism chiefly 
discussed in the literature. And from these discussions, it might appear that these are the 
only two forms of altruism. Despite appearances, however, these are not the only forms 
of altruism in existence. I will now articulate another category of altruism.3 	
 
2.3. Helping altruism	
Although biological and psychological altruism are the prototypical forms of altruism 
                                                3 Interestingly, Clavien and Chapuisat break psychological altruism into two related concepts, 
psychological and preference altruism. They define psychological altruism similarly to Stich's definition 
given above. For them, “An action is [psychologically] altruistic if it results only from motivations directed 
towards the goal of improving others’	interests and welfare”	(2013, p. 127). Preference altruism is defined 
in the following way: “An action is altruistic if it results from preferences for improving others’	interests 
and welfare at some cost to oneself”	(p. 131). These notions are clearly closely related. Both critically 
depend on the etiology of the behavior, whether or not it issues from a particular sort of desire or 
preference. Because they share this similarity, I will lump them together here, since the purpose is to trace 
out the broad categories of altruism. But of course for some studies, it may be beneficial to recognize this 
distinction. 	
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discussed in the literature, there is another form of altruism that has significant currency, 
what I will label helping altruism. To understand helping altruism, consider this quote of 
Warneken and Tomasello  (2008): “we may ask whether human altruism is intrinsically 
or extrinsically motivated; that is, do human beings help one another because the helpful 
act itself is inherently rewarding or only because the helpful act is instrumental in 
bringing about separate outcomes such as material rewards or the avoidance of 
punishment?”	(p. 1785). Here you see an unqualified slip from “human altruism”	to 
“human beings help one another.”	This implies that human altruism in this sense is 
fundamentally based on—or definitionally intertwined with—human helping.	
 Helping in their sense is not necessarily linked to psychological states or fitness 
impacts—helping does not need to be helping procure food, raise young, etc. Instead, it 
could be as simple as aiding another in reaching their goal or otherwise improving their 
life conditions. In the paper from which this quote was drawn, their tests for helping 
consisted of adults dropping objects, reaching for them, but not being successful in 
retrieving them. The experiment gathered data on the extent to which the children would 
pick up the objects. Such helping behaviors of course may be fitness relevant, or may be 
linked with particular psychological states. But what is important is that psychology and 
fitness are not definitionally linked to altruism in this sense. 	
 This concept of altruism is widespread and we see similar definitions by other 
researchers. Consider de Waal’s (2008) definition of what he is calling directed altruism: 
“helping or comforting behavior directed at an individual in need, pain, or distress” (p. 
281). This form of altruism can arise in either of three ways, “1. Altruistic impulse. 
Spontaneous, disinterested helping and caring in reaction to begging or distress signals or 
the sight of another in pain or need. 2. Learned altruism. Helping as a conditioned	
response reinforced by positive outcomes for the actor. 3. Intentional altruism. Help 
based on the prediction of behavioral effects”	(p. 281). Again, we see that this form of 
altruism may, and may even typically, be associated with psychological states of the actor 
or recipient, or may be relevant to fitness outcomes, but it is not definitionally linked with 
either psychological states or fitness outcomes.  	
 Helping altruism is closely associated with Clavien and Chapuisat’s behavioral 
altruism since they both center on benefiting others, where this benefit is not necessarily 
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fitness-relevant and is not by definition linked to psychological desires: “A behaviour is 
altruistic if it brings any kind of benefit to other individuals at some cost for the agent, 
and if there is no foreseeable way for the agent to reap compensatory benefits from her 
behaviour”	(2013, p. 131). They propose this form of altruism because they recognize 
that in some fields altruism is measured in ways that are not necessarily connected to 
psychology or fitness, for example,	“In experimental economics, costs and benefits are 
usually translated into monetary units”	(p. 132). Clavien and Chapuisat’s definition does 
a good job capturing the concept used in experimental economics, but it would need to be 
modified to some degree if it were to include the forms of helping just described. For one 
thing, the requirement that the behavior be costly does not seem to fit with how the 
definition is used by de Waal, Warneken, Tomasello, and others. There is of course 
always an opportunity cost to performing actions (in terms of time and energy), but such 
costs cannot be the ones Clavien and Chapuisat are referring to, since by pointing out that 
the behavior must be costly, they are implicitly contrasting it with noncostly (that is, 
trivially costly) behavior.	
 The second difficulty with Clavien and Chapuisat’s definition is that it subsumes 
mistakes within behavioral altruism. The salmon that accidentally leaps into the mouth of 
a wading bear is not being altruistic even though this leap is beneficial to the recipient 
and there is no way that the bear can repay the salmon for its behavior. Similarly, if an 
Olympic gymnast tragically falls down at the end of her routine, she benefits her 
competitors who are vying for medals. But this is no altruistic act on her part. The fact 
that Clavien and Chapuisat’s definition renders both of these cases acts of altruism shows 
that their definition is problematic if the intent is to separate mistakes from altruistic acts. 
This, however, should not be understood as a critique of Clavien and Chapuisat’s paper. 
On the contrary, their project is to try to capture the definitions in circulation in the 
literature, not to offer definitions that they think should supplant those definitions. Thus, 
their project is descriptive, not prescriptive or stipulative. The project here is to some 
extent prescriptive; I am offering what I think are better alternative definitions, which 
accord with research practices and help to clarify and unify altruistic phenomena.	
 How might one head off these difficulties? One way is to view token actions only 
within the context of the adaptations that bring them about. This is the approach pursued 
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by Tooby and Cosmides (1996): “An adaptationist definition of altruism would focus on 
whether there was a highly nonrandom phenotypic complexity that is organized in such a 
way that it reliably causes an organism to deliver benefits to others, rather than on 
whether the delivery was costly”	(p. 123). This solves problems like the salmon or 
gymnast. Salmon are adapted to swim upstream and to occasionally jump over small 
waterfalls. A side effect of this is that they occasionally leap into the mouths of bears. 
Similarly, the gymnast does not have an adaptation for falling in Olympic competitions, 
thus the behavior does not count as altruistic.	
 If an adult drops a ball, reaches for it, perhaps making an effortful grunt, and then 
a twenty-month-old walks over, picks it up, and hands it to the adult, the infant helped the 
adult. Although such studies may not specifically identify these behaviors as adaptations, 
there is nevertheless reason to think that they center on adaptations, in this case 
adaptations for reading goals of others and helping others in achieving these goals. Tying 
helping altruism to adaptations also does not rule out learned behavior. Consider again de 
Waal’s conception of learned altruism: “Helping as a conditioned response reinforced by 
positive outcomes for the actor.”	Here the adaptations are in terms of adaptations for 
conditioning, for taking particular sorts of outcomes as positive, etc.	
 Clearly this suggestion to base helping altruism on evolved adaptations needs 
further elaboration and a broad survey of the uses of helping altruism to see if it captures 
the right phenomena. But for the purposes here, what matters is that helping altruism is 
helping behavior that is not a mistake. I believe that the adaptation-centered way of 
eliminating mistakes is promising, but other ways may do so even better.		 	
3. How are these altruism concepts related to one another?	
Now that we have an overview of the three basic categories of altruism, we can ask, what 
relationship do these forms of altruism bear to one another? One response is to argue 
that there is a nested relationship among them. A second response is to argue that while 
there may not be a nested relationship, there is nevertheless an essence to these altruism 
concepts, that they bear some essential property in common. By this I mean that there is a 
property or set of properties that are necessary and sufficient for being altruism. A third is 
to argue that	‘altruism’	is simply polysemous, that the same word is used for what are 
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clearly distinct—and not nested or essentially linked—concepts. I will argue for the 
polysemy position, but I will suggest that this does not mean that we should not study 
altruism more generally. Instead, in the following section, I will offer a way to subsume 
the diversity of altruism into a single altruism space. 	
 The fact that we refer to all these forms of altruism as altruism lends at least weak 
evidence to the idea that there is some thread running through each. In order to 
investigate their relationship, let’s make a systematic comparison of their central 
qualities. To do so, consider Table 1. 	
 
 Biological Altruism	 Psychological 
Altruism	 Helping Altruism	
Fitness Benefit to 
recipient/group	 Yes	 Not necessarily	 Not necessarily	
Fitness Detriment 
to actor	 Yes	 Not necessarily	 Not necessarily	
Help for recipient	 Not necessarily	 Not necessarily	 Yes	
Desire to benefit 
others	 Not necessarily	 Yes	 Not necessarily	
 
 
Table 1. The three basic forms of altruism along with some of their properties.	
 
 Does the table imply a nested relationship among the altruism concepts? It 
appears that a nested relationship is argued for by Clavien and Chapuisat for at least some 
of their altruism concepts: “To summarize the relationship between these two notions, 
behavioural altruism is much broader than reproductive altruism. The latter is used in a 
specific way in evolutionary biology and may be seen as a special case nested within the 
broader category of behavioural altruism”	(2013, p. 133). For the way that I have 
This is a preprint of an article whose final and definitive form will be published in Studies in History and Philosophy of 
Biological and Biomedical Sciences. Please do not quote this version without permission of the author. 
12	
articulated the three core concepts of altruism, it appears that a nested relationship does 
not hold. While there may be cases of biological altruism that are also helping altruism, 
as I have described the concepts above, there can also be biological altruism that is not 
helping altruism and helping altruism that is not biological altruism. Assisted suicide 
could count as helping, despite being detrimental to fitness; tampering with another’s 
birth control may be quite unhelpful, despite promoting biological fitness. In fact, as 
Table 1 makes plain, each of these forms of altruism are independent and can be realized 
without necessarily realizing the other forms of altruism. A nested view is thus wrong.	
If the concepts are not nested, perhaps there are one or more core features that all 
of them share. An easy contender for an essence of altruism would be a row in Table 1 in 
which each slot is the same, in this case either all “Not necessarily”	or all “Yes.”	But not 
only is there no such row, if we consider the places in which “Yes”	occurs, there is no 
overlap whatsoever in the rows: none of the forms of altruism has a “Yes”	for the same 
property. This provides no definite proof of a lack of an altruism essence, but does imply 
that there is no essence related to the core altruism properties. Not all of the forms of 
altruism require a benefit (fitness or otherwise) to the recipient, not all of them require a 
detriment (fitness or otherwise) for the actor. Given this fact, there is a burden of proof 
placed on the essentialist to produce a convincing essential property. I am skeptical that 
there is any such property forthcoming, since there is none present in the core features of 
altruism in Table 1, and any other factors in common would be unlikely to be central to 
altruism. 	
If there is neither a hierarchy nor an essence to altruism, we should understand	
‘altruism’	as polysemic, referring to quite distinct concepts: biological altruism centers on 
behavioral dispositions (and their fitness impacts), psychological altruism centers on the 
motivations behind the behaviors, and helping altruism centers on the helpfulness of the 
behavioral outcomes. The absence of an essence or hierarchy, however, does not mean 
that the altruism concepts are sufficiently unrelated that we should not look for 
connections between them—it is not merely the label ‘altruism’	that is what is tying all of 
the forms of altruism together. If, for example, people began to refer to each truism about 
Al Gore—Al Gore was vice president, Al Gore is concerned about climate change—as	
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‘altruism’	this does not mean that this is another form of altruism.4 Instead, altruism is a 
family of concepts centering on benefiting others and possibly costing the actor. It is thus 
worth continuing to pursue the question of how these concepts are related to one another, 
and to do this, I will introduce an altruism framework. 	
 
4. An altruism framework	
The proposed essentialist and nested relationships between the three forms of altruism are 
conceptual relationships; they offer a view of how these three concepts are related to one 
another. The nested proposal argues that they are in some way tied together in virtue of 
their nested relationship. The essentialist proposal is that there is one or more core 
features that these concepts bear that unite them as altruism. My proposal is that we 
should search for empirical, not conceptual ties between these forms of altruism.	
 The idea is this: If each of these forms of altruism can be captured by a single 
scalar quantity from, say, 0 to 1, then we could think of each form of altruism as 
representing an axis in a three-dimensional altruism space (see Figure 1). The 
representation of this altruism space will allow for formulating and testing interesting 
empirical questions, ones that may not have been considered otherwise. But before we 
can get there, let’s consider whether such a space is indeed coherent. In particular, can 
each form of altruism be quantified by a single scalar quantity? And if so, what is the best 
way to scalarize them? 	
 In order to scalarize altruism, we must first consider whether we are focused on 
token actions or on token individuals. That is, we could be considering how altruistic 
individuals are, or we could consider how altruistic their particular actions are. Thus, 
before we create a rank ordering of each of the forms of altruism, we need to first decide 
whether we want the space to be a space of organisms or their behaviors. While both are 
possible, for the purposes here, we should pursue a space of actions, not organisms. The 
reason is that defining how altruistic an individual is requires an understanding of the 
degree to which that individual is disposed to perform altruistic actions, which in turn 
requires some sort of ranking of how altruistic these actions are. Furthermore, such 
                                                4	Thank	you	to	one	of	the	reviewers	for	the	Al	Gore	example.	
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ranking of individuals is made all the more difficult by the fact that patterns of exhibited 
behaviors can vary in multiple dimensions, including their frequency, intensity, the 
variance in their intensity, etc. Distilling all these variables into a single value is thus no 
easy task, and it is a task we can sidestep if we focus on actions alone. Therefore, the 
space I will consider here will be for actions only, not individuals.	
 
	




What would a rank-ordering of helpfulness consist in? Is there a common metric for 
quantifying helpfulness such that comparisons within and across species are possible? Is 
an ant helping to drag a beetle larva to its nest being more or less helpful than a chimp 
picking lice from the back of a fellow chimp? Such a question is all but impossible to 
answer, at least when presented with these two behaviors in isolation. A better approach 
is instead to consider a single domain, such as the ant helping drag the grub. For such a 
case, it is fairly clear what it would be to have a helpfulness value of 0, it would be not 
helping at all in the process of dragging the grub. (There could of course be unhelpful 
behavior—pulling in the wrong direction in such a case.) And maximal helpfulness could 
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be understood as taking over the entire task of hauling the grub or, if this is impossible 
given the size of the grub, maximizing the amount of time and effort it gives to the task. 	
 Understood in this way, the values along the helpfulness axis in the figure are 
relative helpfulness, not absolute helpfulness. Thus, if we fill the space with ant, chimp, 
and human behaviors, we must understand that each of these is quantified within its own 
relative scale. This does not, however, mean that such cross-taxa comparisons are 
spurious. Instead, it is merely that they have to be interpreted carefully. Discovering that 
helpfulness is positively correlated with another form of altruism will be of interest, even 
if these are relative notions of altruism—in fact, they may be of more interest because 
this is the case.	
 
4.2. Psychological Altruism	
Now consider psychological altruism. Psychological altruism is based on an act for which 
the ultimate desire is the wellbeing of another. How can such acts be ordered from more 
to less psychologically altruistic? A challenge in making this ordering is that one’s desire 
can vary independently of the degree to which the behavior boosts the well-being of the 
recipient. One can have a strong desire to effect a modest boost in another’s wellbeing, 
and one could have a moderate desire to effect a strong boost to their wellbeing.	
 There are of course multiple solutions to the puzzle of distilling psychological 
altruism into a single value, but I would suggest the simple solution of considering the 
desire and the anticipated wellbeing as two scalar components of psychological altruism. 
A single scalar value could thus be achieved by combining them in some nonadditive 
way, multiplying them together being a simple possibility. This single scalar is 
represented as the vertical axis of Figure 1.	
 
4.3. Biological altruism	
Finally, consider biological altruism. This is the most challenging form of altruism to 
place into a single scalar quantity. The reason for this is that while psychological and 
helping altruism answer “yes”	only to one each of the properties in Table 1 (“desire to 
benefit others”	and “other benefit to recipient,”	respectively), biological altruism answers 
yes to both fitness benefit to recipient/group and fitness detriment to actor. Fitness cost to 
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actor and benefit to recipients/group seem sufficiently heterogeneous that this form of 
altruism would require (at least) two dimensions. But while there may be times when 
such a two-dimensional representation would be useful, for the purposes of inquiring into 
the broader relationships between the three forms of altruism, it is beneficial if each of 
these forms of altruism can be represented by a single value. 	
 A good way to reduce biological altruism to a single value is to do what was done 
for psychological altruism (and the two factors of the degree of desire and the degree of 
well-being), to mathematically combine them to make a single scalar. Again, one could 
multiply the two factors together or perform some more sophisticated operation on them. 
Some ways of reducing the variables into a single scalar will be better than others. 
Adding them, for example, will be problematic. Consider the case where there is no 
detriment to the actor. Such a case is clearly not an instance of biological altruism. But if 
there were still a benefit to the recipient(s), and if one derived the scalar from the sum of 
this benefit and the detriment to the actor, then the scalar would be positive (it would 
register as biologically altruistic). If, on the other hand, the values were multiplied, then 
the correct value of zero would be registered for such actions that bear no cost to the 
actor. I will thus consider the horizontal axis in Figure 1 to be the product (or some other 
mathematical scalarization) of the fitness detriment to the actor and the fitness benefit to 
the recipient(s)/group. 	
 
4.4. The altruism space	
Now that we have each of the dimensions fleshed out, we can begin to consider what 
empirical questions can be asked of the framework. Consider the question of the link 
between psychological and biological altruism. As mentioned, Sober and Wilson (1998) 
argue that while there is logical independence of psychological and biological altruism, 
the two may be empirically linked: “natural selection is unlikely to have given us purely 
egoistic motives”	(p. 12). Others, such as Stich (2007), have challenged Sober and 
Wilson’s reasons for holding that psychological altruism is a probable evolutionary 
outcome. Regardless of which side of this debate is correct, the altruism space of Figure 1 
allows us to ask many more empirical questions, and to be able to move far beyond 
simple, two-variable comparisons. 	
This is a preprint of an article whose final and definitive form will be published in Studies in History and Philosophy of 
Biological and Biomedical Sciences. Please do not quote this version without permission of the author. 
17	
 The addition of helping altruism opens up a third dimension of possible 
relationships between the varieties of altruism, and allows one to see the complex 
relationships that the forms of altruism bear to one another. Instead of focusing on simple 
comparisons between pairs of variables, we can investigate the infinite number of ways 
that the three forms of altruism could be related to one another. For example, a study of 
behavior might reveal a tight link between psychological and helping altruism, but the 
behaviors may have little or no fitness consequence (a in Figure 1). Another possibility is 
that the group of behaviors cluster close to the middle, such that many of them exhibit 
intermediate amounts of helping, psychological, and biological altruism (b in Figure 1). 
Yet another possibility is that the behaviors do not exhibit any psychological altruism 
(perhaps the organism is unable to form the requisite forms of desire), and that helping 
and biological altruism are not associated (c in Figure 1).	
 In addition to the three distinct possibilities represented by a, b, and c in Figure 1, 
one could also imagine a single study producing a scattering of points like that 
represented by the totality of a, b, and c. The fact that such a possibility exists shows that 
by moving beyond mere dyadic comparisons and using a space like that of Fig. 1, one can 
represent and evaluate the richness and complexity of the relationship between the three 
forms of altruism.	
 This is not to say that visually depicting altruism in three dimensions will always 
be the most useful representation. Conducting the analyses mathematically and then 
presenting multiple two-dimensional graphs may in some cases be visually more 
informative, since three-dimensional graphs projected onto two dimensions have 
considerable limitations. But however the data are presented visually, the point 
nevertheless holds that there is use in investigating the patterns within this larger altruism 
space.	
 
4.5. Is this altruism space the best altruism space?	
In distilling each form of altruism into a single scalar, one might wonder if too much 
information is lost in the formation of the space. Might there be a better information-
preserving space that retains all independent dimensions related to altruism? Such a space 
could be constructed, not from the columns in Table 1, but from the rows: fitness benefit 
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to recipient/group, fitness detriment to actor, help for recipient, desire to benefit others. In 
fact, one could unpack these categories into further dimensions. Other benefit to recipient 
could be several dimensions, one for each kind of benefit in some baroque taxonomy of 
benefits.	
 There are five reasons why these complex n-dimensional spaces, built on more 
atomic instead of composite dimensions, may not be more illuminating. First, while in 
some cases atomic dimensions may be more information preserving than composite ones, 
the very act of breaking composites down into atoms is laden with assumptions. One 
might, say, break down the helping category into a number of distinct forms of helping. 
But what justifies this taxonomy? There are many ways to create a taxonomy such as this 
and each carries its own set of assumptions and interpretations. Thus the added 
assumptions built into the more complex n-dimensional space may obscure as much as 
clarify the phenomenon of altruism.	
 Second, it is not clear that any array of putatively atomic variables will be truly 
atomic. Consider fitness benefit to others. Fitness benefits can be distributed in an infinite 
number of ways. For example, there could be a large benefit to a small number of 
individuals and a small benefit to others. Or perhaps each individual will receive a unique 
quantity of benefit, directly proportional to their age, say. How do we create atomic 
dimensions for such a case? For such a distribution of benefits, we could have one 
dimension be the mean benefit, another the variance, another the kurtosis, etc. But of 
course these are not atomic, they are statistics pooled from sets of data across a 
population. Perhaps instead we should have a distinct axis for each individual, which 
records the benefit received. This suggestion leads to the third problem with the atomic 
proposal.	
 Third, by proliferating dimensions, we may be able to maximize data 
preservation, but we end up with a space merely containing the raw data, and not one that 
illuminates their connections. The space is then not a model of altruism, it is just a 
container for raw data. One could of course use statistical techniques like cluster analysis 
to reveal patterns within the multidimensional space, but this then leaves the difficult task 
of relating these patterns to discussions of altruism in the literature. Related to this is the 
fourth problem, which is that if this space is supposed to illuminate these various forms 
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of altruism, then there must be a way of delimitating regions within the space as 
biological altruism, helping altruism, etc. But in order to do so, the same kind of variable 
composites inherent in the space I propose must be created in order to accomplish this. 	
 Finally, by limiting the altruism space to only three dimensions, it is something 
that can be graphically represented in a way that a higher n-dimensional space cannot. 
This allows for visual inspection of the patterns and, thus, greater insight into the 
structure of the space. Although the question of which set of dimensions is the most 
insightful is ultimately an empirical question, these reasons lend support for the claim 
that the three-dimensional space proposed here is illuminating and may even occupy an 
ideal place between overly crude mere measures of associations between pairs of 
variables, and a complex n-dimensional space.	
 
5. Conclusions	
Can altruism be unified? The answer of course critically depends on how one understands 
altruism and what one means by unification. If unification requires one or more essential 
properties, then unification may not be possible. What I have instead argued for here is 
that there are three fundamentally distinct forms of altruism, and that there is no unique 
property that they all share. But despite this disunity, there is a way to make a unified 
altruism space. This space can be used to explore whether the forms of altruism are 
empirically linked and, if so, what relationships they bear to one another. The rich 
possibilities offered by the space allow for an unlimited number of ways that these forms 
of altruism can be related. And only through such a space can the full complexity of 
altruism be revealed. 		
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